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This paper explores banks’ entry decisions into a duopolistic loan market to
shed light on the prolonged slump in the Japanese loan market in the 1990s.
The game-theoretic real options approach is employed to analyze the effects of
uncertainty on lending decisions. Special emphasis is given to the differences
resulting from the alternative assumptions regarding whether the roles of
leader and follower are interchangeable or predetermined. The theoretical
model shows that when the roles are predetermined as in the case of the
Japanese main bank system, both leader and follower banks have a greater
incentive to wait until the loan demand condition improves sufficiently than
when the roles are interchangeable. The numerical analysis shows that a rise
in the demand volatility raises threshold values of current demand, which
raises the incentive to wait for both leader and follower banks. In contrast,
the direction of the effect of a change in the expected growth rate of demand
depends on the assumptions regarding which parameter is adjustable, the
risk-adjusted discount rate, or the dividend rate. The effects of a change in
the probability of bankruptcy of a borrowing firm and the interest rate 
elasticity of loan demand are also examined.
Key words: Bank lending; Uncertainty; Entry decision; Monitoring costs;
Duopolistic market; Real options; Stochastic gameI. Introduction
The Japanese economy has experienced unprecedented economic fluctuations since
1985. In particular, a significant surge in private bank
1 loans during the so-called
bubble period, a subsequent sharp fall starting in 1991, and a declining trend that
continues up to today are widely recognized as noteworthy phenomena.
2 Figure 1
3
shows that the change in loans and discounts as a percentage of nominal GDP has
been fluctuating below 0 percent since around 1993.
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1. I use the word “private” to distinguish between domestically licensed (private) banks and government-related
(public) financial organizations such as Development Bank of Japan, Housing Loan Corporation, and Japan
Finance Cooperation for Small Business. The financial organizations in the latter category are expected to play the
role of funding the fields that are not profitable enough in the perspective of private banks, but provide benefits
from a social point of view. 
2. For more details, see Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000), for example.
3. One interesting point in Figure 1 is that although previously a decrease in bank loans relative to the size of 
nominal GDP was typically seen during periods of tight monetary policy, the recent slump occurred despite
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Percent
Notes: 1.  The statistic is in terms of the percent ratio of an increase in loans and 
                discounts by domestically licensed banks to nominal GDP. It is seasonally 
                adjusted by taking the three-quarter moving average.
 2. Shaded intervals indicate the period during which the official discount rate 
     was raised.
 3. The statistic includes both banking accounts and trust accounts of domestically 
     licensed banks.
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Data CD-ROM.
Figure 1  Increase in Loans and Discounts by Domestically Licensed Banks
There are two aspects to the recent slump in bank lending. One is the acceleration
of loan repayments by corporations aiming at reducing interest-bearing liabilities as
part of restructuring plans. The other is a decrease in new bank loans reflecting both
a decline in loan demand by corporations and a prudent attitude by banks towardextending new loans. Figure 2 shows a steady downward trend in new loans for
equipment funds after a temporary pickup in 1995.
4 This paper focuses on the latter
aspect, that is, the decline in new loans. 
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4. This statistic is available only from 1994.
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¥ trillions
Notes: 1. The statistic is new loans for equipment funds extended by domestically 
licensed banks.
2. The statistic includes both banking accounts and trust accounts of 
domestically licensed banks.
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Data CD-ROM.
Figure 2  New Loans for Equipment Funds by Domestically Licensed Banks
Many plausible causes have been pointed out for the slump in loan demand,
besides the direct impact of the prolonged recession. For example, many analysts cite
a downward shift in investment planning by nonfinancial corporations. Also, it is
widely believed that a series of liberalization measures in the Japanese capital markets
have prompted a switch from indirect financing to direct financing such as equity
financing and the issue of corporate bonds, particularly among leading corporations.
Turning to the supply side of bank loans, some argue that one of the reasons 
for the slump in bank lending lies in the fact that real estate has been extensively 
used as collateral, which is particularly the case with new borrowers.
5 Related to this
point, it is often pointed out that, during the bubble period, banks did not have 
to make rigorous monitoring efforts due to an almost religious faith that potential
losses in the future could be sufficiently covered by the real estate that borrowers put
up as collateral. 
In some sense, monitoring ability can be viewed as fixed capital that takes a long
time to accumulate. Hence, if accumulation of monitoring ability is neglected for a
prolonged period, then its recovery (re-accumulation) cannot be done in a short
period and thus banks will suffer larger costs in judging the creditworthiness ofpotential borrowers.
6 Thus, a delay in accumulating monitoring ability might have
something to do with the recent overly prudent attitude of banks toward extending
loans to borrowers.
As argued by Aoki (1994), transactions involving funds between firms planning
to undertake projects and intermediaries like banks entail a high degree of informa-
tional asymmetry.
7 To overcome this problem,
8 there need to be some mechanisms to
assess the creditworthiness of the projects. Monitoring is one of the mechanisms and,
from the perspective of banks, it incurs sunk costs in the sense that they cannot be
retrieved once they are actually paid.
9
To be more specific, monitoring has three categories. The first one is ex ante
monitoring that aims to assess borrowers’ creditworthiness regarding projects and to
screen them. The second one is interim monitoring, the purpose of which is to closely
observe management in order to alleviate the problem of moral hazard. The last one is
ex post monitoring, which tries to verify borrowers’ financial condition and apply
appropriate punitive and corrective actions if necessary. Among these categories, this
paper focuses on the first, ex ante monitoring. Thus, this paper concentrates on the
entry decisions by banks as to whether they extend a new loan or not. 
As emphasized by Sheard (1994), among the most salient features in Japanese
banks’ monitoring activities is that most large firms have maintained a close relation-
ship with a bank. Such close bank-corporation ties are often termed the “main bank
system.” The main bank is, in most cases, a principal shareholder in the firm and
plays a decisive role in monitoring it. 
Monitoring is sometimes delegated to the main bank.
10 In the words of Higano
(1987), the main bank plays a role of “bell cow” or “bellwether” in that other banks
follow its decisions, because information regarding the screening process effected by
the main bank is revealed (or sent as a signal) via its actual lending decisions.
11
Another important aspect of actual lending in Japan is that the main bank has the
largest loan share, but often it is not the sole lender. Thus, the loan market for a 
specific potential borrower can be reasonably approximated to be an oligopolistic
market.
12 Also, it is widely known that the loan syndicate led by the main bank 
is hierarchical in terms of proportionate loan shares. In that scheme, the main 
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6. In this regard, the credit guarantee system is considered to have facilitated lending to small and medium-sized
firms by reducing monitoring costs. But the possibility should not be overlooked that the system itself weakened
the banks’ incentive to accumulate monitoring ability.
7. See Akerlof (1970) for the original discussion on informational asymmetry.
8. It should be noted here that even if the problem of informational asymmetry is completely eliminated, uncertainty
inherent in projects themselves remains.
9. In other words, monitoring efforts are irreversible. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) define the term “sunk costs” or
“irreversible” as follows: investment expenditures are sunk costs or irreversible when they are firm or industry specific.
For typical examples, they cite most investments in marketing and advertising.
10. The delegated monitoring theory was first developed by Diamond (1984). It states that monitoring typically
involves increasing returns to scale, implying that specialized banks are more efficient in handling it. Therefore,
individual lenders tend to delegate monitoring activity instead of performing it themselves.
11. It should be noted, however, that this information activity entails the problem of free-riding by the follower
bank. One possible solution is to impose fees on the follower bank to internalize the externality. Although in the
Japanese case this kind of information fee has not been explicit, it is often said that the monopolization of some
profitable businesses such as domestic and foreign exchange operations by the leader bank has played the role.
12. In words of Sheard (1994), there is exclusivity in monitoring with non-exclusivity in lending.bank decides loan shares in advance, and then the follower banks judge whether 
participation in the loan syndicate is really beneficial to them. Hence, if a researcher
takes a perfectly competitive or monopolist market structure as given in analyzing
bank lending decisions, he or she might miss some important aspects.
Further, under the assumption of uncertainty and irreversibility, it is natural to
think that banks
13 should consider the option to wait until economic conditions
improve sufficiently. This is a typical setting of a so-called real options approach first
applied by McDonald and Siegel (1984) and later extensively reviewed by Dixit and
Pindyck (1994).
As emphasized by Trigeorgis (1993) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), among 
others, the options approach helps explain why actual investment decisions by the
business sector cannot be explained by conventional wisdom such as the net present
value (NPV) approach. In reality, firms invest only in projects that are expected to
yield a return well in excess of the required rate of return.
14
The adoption of the real options framework is likely to provide an important
insight into the role of uncertainty and sunk costs in the recent slump in the Japanese 
bank loan market. Specifically, within the framework, one can see the change in 
the value of the option to wait as one changes the values of such parameters as 
sunk costs (monitoring costs), the risk-adjusted discount rate, uncertainty in the
future demand conditions (volatility), the expected growth rate of demand, and the
subjective probability of bankruptcy of the borrowing firm. The last three parameters 
characterize the stochastic process.
15 Thus, one can numerically assess the optimal 
lending decisions directly in terms of uncertainty and monitoring ability.
Motivated by the above discussion, this paper attempts to analyze lending (entry)
decisions employing the real options approach. The market structure I assume is 
a duopolistic market in which the leader bank makes entry decisions taking the 
reaction of followers into consideration and then, given the leader bank’s action, the
follower bank determines whether to enter the loan market or not. Note that
although this paper is motivated by the literature on the main bank system, the aim
is not necessarily to directly analyze the main bank system itself, but to examine the
role of uncertainty in extending a new loan in a duopolistic loan market setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the basic 
theoretical framework of the game-theoretic real options approach. Section III
numerically analyzes lending decisions in a duopolistic loan market. Section IV links
the insights derived from the real options approach to episodes of the recent bank
lending situation in Japan. Section V concludes the study.
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13. Throughout the paper, uncertainty indicates that the best one can do is to assess the subjective probabilities of
the alternative outcomes that entail greater or smaller profit (or loss) for a project.
14. On the downside, firms prefer to stay in business for a long time despite the situation that operating profit is well
below operating costs so that they lose.
15. Actually, I regard the shift parameter of loan demand as a stochastic variable instead of the return itself because 
I analyze a duopolistic loan market. To be specific, I adopt a combined geometric Brownian motion and
(Poisson) jump process as an underlying stochastic process.II. Theoretical Framework
A. Basic Setup
Introduction of an oligopolistic market structure into a stochastic dynamic model
usually causes many practical difficulties. In fact, applications of the game-theoretic
option theory are among the most recent ones. Smets (1993) developed a very 
simplified version of this kind of model in which there are a leader and a follower
16
to analyze the decision-making between exporting and foreign direct investment. 
Despite the modeling difficulties, in its easiest form, the essence of the model is
actually not too difficult to state. The existence of uncertainty and irreversibility
implies that there is some value to an option to wait, and the higher the degree of
uncertainty, the greater the hesitancy both players have. The fear of preemption by a
rival, however, prompts the leader to make decisions without delay. Which of these
considerations is more relevant depends on the underlying parameters and the 
current state of the stochastic variable.
Also, whether the roles of leader and follower are interchangeable or predetermined
is of particular importance to modeling. This is because if the roles are predetermined, 
the follower bank cannot enter the loan market before the leader has done so, and 
the leader recognizes the value of the option to wait from this source. I describe each
case in turn. 
The theoretical framework basically follows Smets (1993) and Dixit and Pindyck
(1994), but the following modifications are made to enrich implications for bank
lending behavior in a duopolistic market: 
(1) The demand curve is specified as downward-sloping and its demand elasticity
is constant in any region. 
(2) Ex ante loan shares can be arbitrarily changed to investigate the relationship
between ex ante loan shares and threshold values of current demand for entry.
(3) Sunk (monitoring) costs of both banks can be separately specified to explicitly
take the leader bank’s informational cost advantage into consideration. 
(4) A combined geometric Brownian motion and Poisson downward jump
process is adopted to the demand shift parameter instead of the standard 
geometric Brownian motion to take the possibility of bankruptcy of the 
borrowing firm
17 into consideration.
Now, let me consider the value of the follower bank contemplating entry to the
loan market.
18 Let vf (Π f) denote the present discounted value of the follower bank’s
future cash flow net of operating cost from actual lending Π f ≡ rLLf, where rL is the
interest rate (net of operating costs) that is common to both leader and follower
banks and Lf is the amount of a new loan extended by the follower bank. 
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16. For other works on the trade-off between the strategic incentive to invest early in an oligopoly and the value of
flexibility under uncertainty, see Appelbaum and Lim (1985) and Spencer and Brander (1992), for example.
17. In fact, after the bursting of the bubble economy, the liabilities of bankrupt corporations as a proportion of total
financial liabilities held by nonfinancial corporations rose from 0.25 percent in 1990 to 2.5 percent in 1998
according to a survey by Teikoku Databank, Ltd. In 1999, the figure dropped to about 0.6 percent due to the
adoption of stabilization measures under the credit guarantee system.
18. This “backward solution” is a familiar method in analyzing the dynamic duopolistic strategy.I assume that rL is specified as 
rL =Y (Ll + Lf)
–ε ,( 1 )
where  Y denotes the shift parameter of loan demand, Ll the amount of a loan
extended by the leader bank, and ε the inverse of the interest rate elasticity of 
loan demand.
19 Here, by loan demand I mean demand by a specific potential 
borrower.
20 Demand uncertainty is assumed to follow the following combined 
geometric Brownian motion and Poisson downward jump process:
dY = α Ydt + σ Ydz –Ydq,( 2 )
where α denotes the expected growth rate parameter that is relevant only in the
Brownian motion part, σ the volatility parameter, dz the increment of the standard
Wiener process, and dq the increment of a Poisson process with mean arrival time
rate λ . For computational facility, I assume that E [(dz)(dq)] = 0 holds. Equation (2)
states that if an event occurs, Y falls by some fixed ratio φ (0 ≤ φ ≤ 1).
21
Equation (2) implies 
d Π f = α Π fdt +σ Π fdz – Π fdq,( 3 )
since Ll, Lf, and ε are assumed to be fixed. Here, note that it does not make sense
unless vf(0) = 0 holds because if profits are zero in the geometric Brownian motion,
they will remain zero forever.
It is important to note that the expected rate of change in Π f is not α as in the
case of the standard geometric Brownian motion, but 
E[dΠ f/Π f] –––––––––– = α – λφ .( 4 )
dt
Hence, given the value of φ , an increase in λ decreases the expected rate of capital
gains on Π f by increasing the chance of a sudden downward jump in Π f. Also, note
that since a Poisson event occurs infrequently, most of the time the variance of
d Π f/Π f over a short interval of time dt is just that of the part governed by the
Brownian motion σ
2dt. If the jump happens, however, it causes a large deviation,
thus its contribution to the variance cannot be neglected.
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19. In the original model by Smets (1993), demand is assumed to be sufficiently elastic to ensure capacity production,
implying that total output is either zero, one, or two depending on the number of active firms.
20. In this paper, for simplicity, I assume that the borrowing firm is passive in that it does not have any bargaining
power in making loan contracts. Introducing the game-theoretic interaction between borrowers and lenders is
one of my future tasks.
21. Formally, one can write 
 α Ydt + σ Y√
—
dt with probability (1 – λ dt)/2
dY =  α Ydt – σ Y√
—
dt with probability (1 – λ dt)/2
 –φ Y with probability λ dt .
As will be discussed later, the case of φ = 1 can be regarded as the case of bankruptcy of the borrower.B. The Case of Interchangeable Roles of Leader and Follower
The first step to solve this kind of oligopolistic model is to find a decision-making
rule for the follower, assuming that the leader has already entered the market. The
second step is to consider the entry decision by the leader taking account of the 
follower’s response. 
Now let Ff (Π f) denote the follower’s value of the option to lend. For simplicity, 
I assume that there is no fixed finite time horizon. The Bellman equation for the
optimal lending rule can be written as
1 ρ Ff (Π f) = max E ––dFf (Π f) , (5)
θ [dt ]
where ρ denotes the risk-adjusted discount rate and θ the control (decision) variable
of the follower.
22 Applying Ito’s Lemma for the combined geometric Brownian
motion and jump process
23 yields
1 ρ Ff (Π f)dt =α Π fF′f (Π f)dt + –– σ
2Π
2
fF″f (Π f)dt – λ {Ff (Π f)–   Ff [(1 – φ )Π f]}dt,
2
– λ {Ff (Π f)–   Ff [(1 – φ )Π f]}dt,
(6)
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22. Formally, derivation of equation (5) goes as follows. First, the original form of the Bellman equation can be
expressed as 
1 Ff (Π f, t) = max –––––––E[Ff (Π ′f, t + ∆ t)| Π f, θ ] ,
θ {1 + ρ ∆ t }
where Π 'f denotes the value of Π f a time ∆ t later.
Multiplying this equation by (1 + ρ ∆ t) yields
1 ρ Ff (Π f, t) = max E ––dFf (Π f) ,
θ [dt ]
where I let ∆ t approach zero and E[(1/dt)dFf ] denotes the limit of E[∆ Ff/∆ t]. If one assumes that the time 
horizon is infinite, then the preceding equation becomes an ordinary differential equation with Π f as its only
independent variable. Thus, equation (5) follows.
23. If the stochastic process is
dx =a(x,t)dt +b(x,t)dz +g(x,t)dq,
then the expected value of the change in any function H(x,t) can be given by
∂ H ∂ H 1           ∂
2H E[dH ] =  ––– +a(x,t)––– +––b
2(x,t)––– dt +Eφ {λ [H(x +g(x,t)φ ,t) –H(x,t)]}dt, [ ∂ t ∂ x 2           ∂ x
2 ]
where φ is the size of the jump when the event happens. For more technical details, see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994). In general, inclusion of a jump process is advantageous because it enables one to describe a more realistic
situation, but there are some practical problems. The most important problem is that the adoption of a jump
process makes building a perfect hedge impossible. Thus, it is not possible to build a riskless portfolio, which is
used in Black-Scholes-Merton type contingent claims analysis. This is why I use dynamic programming with an
exogenous risk-adjusted discount rate ρ instead of contingent claims analysis. To avoid such a disadvantage, one
sometimes assumes that the jump-risk is nonsystematic, that is, uncorrelated with the market portfolio. That
enables one to construct a risk-free portfolio. In such a case, equation (6) can also be derived by contingent
claims analysis.where F′f (Π ) ≡ ∂ Ff /∂ Π f and F″f (Π ) ≡ ∂
2Ff /∂ Π
2




fF″f (Π f) + (ρ – δ )Π fF′f (Π f) + λ Ff [(1 – φ )Π f] = 0.
2            
– (ρ + λ )Ff (Π f) + λ Ff [(1 – φ )Π f] = 0.
(7)
Note that in deriving equation (7), I use the relationship of ρ ≡ α + δ , where δ
denotes the dividend rate. As suggested by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), in such a case,
the solution
24 has a form
Ff (Π f) =A(Π f)
β 1,( 8 )
where A and β 1 are constants to be determined. The expression for β 1 > 1 can be found
by solving the following fundamental quadratic equation:
1 –– σ
2β (β – 1) + (ρ – δ )β – (ρ + λ )+   λ (1 – φ )
β = 0. (9) 2
Unfortunately, however, one cannot find any closed-form solutions for equation (9).
Hence, I consider a special case of φ = 1, which means that once the jump happens,
it removes the full value of Π f and remains at zero forever. That is, one can think of
the event as an abrupt bankruptcy. In such a special case, the two roots β 1 and β 2 of
equation (9) are given by
————————————
 1      ρ – δ ρ – δ 1 
2 2(ρ + λ ) β 1 ≡ –– – –––––– +    –––––– – –– + ––––––––– > 1  [ 2         σ
2 ] √ [ σ
2 2 ] σ
2
 ———————————— (10)
 1      ρ – δ ρ – δ 1 
2 2(ρ + λ ) β 2 ≡ –– – –––––– –    –––––– – –– + ––––––––– < 0.  [ 2         σ
2 ] √ [ σ
2 2 ] σ
2
Now, consider the boundary conditions
25 that must be satisfied at a threshold
value Π–




f) – LfIf , (11)
where vf(Π–
f) = Π–
f/δ and If denotes the sunk costs
26 per unit of loan. Equation (11)
states that at the threshold value Π–
f, the value of the option should equal the net
value from exercising it. 
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24. Strictly speaking, one must write the solution as
Ff (Π f) =A1(Π f)
β 1 + A2(Π f)
β 2 (β 1 > 1 and β 2 < 0)
instead of equation (8). The condition of Ff (0) = 0, however, enables one to omit the second term on the 
right-hand side of the equation.
25. Generally speaking, the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, together with the condition Ff (0) = 0,
consist of so-called boundary conditions.
26. In this paper, I assume that monitoring costs account for nearly all of the sunk costs.Second, the smooth-pasting condition is
F′f (Π–
f) = v′f (Π–
f), (12)
which implies that Ff (Π f) andvf(Π f) – LfIf should meet tangentially at the threshold
value Π–




β 1 = ––– – LfIf  δ




β 1–1 = –– .  δ
Solving Π–
f from these conditions yields
β 1 Π–
f = ––––––δ LfIf . (14) β 1 – 1
Now let Y –
f be a threshold value of Y at which the follower decides to enter the
market. Y –
f is found by
β 1 δ If Y –
f = –––––– –––––––––. (15) β 1 – 1 (Ll +Lf)
–ε
Thus, the follower’s value of the option to lend as a function of Y can be summarized as
 1
 if Y ≥ Y –
f, then Ff (Y ) = ––LfY(Ll +Lf)




 otherwise,       Ff (Y ) =  –– ––LfY –
f (Ll +Lf)
–ε –LfIf .  (Y –
f )[ δ ]
Here, it should be noted that if the amount of the loan extended by the leader is
zero (Ll = 0), the follower’s value can be regarded as the monopolist’s value denoted
Fm(Y ). Figure 3 depicts the entry decision by this monopolist bank. At the threshold
value of Y –
m(= Y –
f ), Fm(Y ), and vm(Y ) – LmIm meet tangentially, which is required by
boundary conditions (11) and (12). 
Next, consider the lending decision by the leader. If Y ≥ Y –
f, then the follower will
lend immediately and the leader’s cash flow will be LlY(Ll +Lf)
–ε . On the other hand,
if Y < Y –
f, then the follower will prefer to wait until period T when Y –
f is first hit.
Hence, the leader will have cash flow equivalent to LlYL l
–ε , implying that its expected
(gross) value before netting out the sunk costs can be expressed as
LlY –







–ρ T]––––––––––––––. (17) [
s=0 ]   δ
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 1 if Y ≥ Y –
f, thenFl(Y ) = ––LlY (Ll + Lf)
–ε – LlIl.  δ  1                   Y




 δ [( Y –
f )]

 Y 1 + ––
β 1
––LlY –
f (L l +L f)
–ε –LlIl.             (Y –
f )[ δ ]
And another threshold value of Y denoted Y –
l at which the leader makes an entry
decision must satisfy the condition
Fl(Y –
l)=F f(Y –
l) >  0, (19)
which shows that at Y –
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vm (Y) – LmIm  (value of active monopolist)






Figure 3  Entry Decision by a Monopolist Bank
27. Note that in the region of Y, which satisfies Fl(Y ) < Ff(Y ), the leader prefers to wait because in such a region
the leader does not have an incentive to become a leader. The decision-making rules by both banks are described in Figure 4. The figure
shows the interaction between the leader and the follower banks when they are 
identical except for the interchangeable roles they assume. Two curves representing
the leader’s and follower’s values cross each other at Y –
l and meet tangentially at Y –
f.
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Ff  (follower’s value)
Follower enters Leader enters
Yf  Yl
Note: The figure is drawn under the assumption that both banks are identical except for the
          interchangeable (random) roles they assume.
Figure 4  The Case of Interchangeable Roles of Leader and Follower
C. The Case of Predetermined Roles of Leader and Follower
In this subsection, the strategic interaction is modified as follows. First, before 
actually paying the sunk (monitoring) costs, the predetermined leader declares the 
ex ante loan shares (amounts) of each bank. Then, both banks judge strategically
whether they will enter the market based on current demand (return) conditions.
In this setting, the leader recognizes the values of two additional options.
28 First,
there is an option to wait over a range of small values of Y, whose value should 
tangentially meet the leader’s value of the option to lend Fl(Y ) at a threshold value
Y –
1.
29 Its value denoted G(Y) can be written as
30
G(Y ) = BY
β 1, (20)
where  B  is a constant to be determined and β 1 is the positive root given by 
equation (10).
28. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for this idea.
29. Clearly, the condition Y
–
l <  Y
–
1 <  Y
–
f must hold.
30. Formally, this is written as G(Y) = B1Y
β 1 + B 2Y
β 2 (β 1 > 1 and β 2 < 0). Imposing the condition G(0) = 0 yields
equation (20), however.The boundary conditions are
 Fl(Y –




1) = G′(Y –
1),
where Fl(Y ) corresponds to the case of Y < Y –
f in equation (18). To be specific, the
boundary conditions can be rewritten as
 1              Y –
1
β 1–1 Y –
1
β 1 1 ––L lY –
1L l
–ε 1– –– +  –– ––Y –
fLl(Ll +Lf)
–ε –L lIl =BY –
1
β 1
 δ [( Y –
f )] ( Y –
f )[ δ ]
(22) 




–ε + ––β 1 –– {Ll[(L l +Lf)
–ε – Ll
–ε ]} =Bβ 1Y –
1
β 1–1.  δδ (Y –
f )
This can be regarded as a system of two equations with the two unknown variables 
B and Y –
1. Thus, one can solve the system numerically.
Second, over a range of relatively large values of Y, there is also an option to wait,




denoted H(Y ) can be written as
H(Y ) = C1Y
β 1 +C 2Y
β 2, (23)
where C1 and C2 are constants to be determined and β 1 and β 2 are two roots given by
equation (10).
The boundary conditions are
 Fl(Y –
2) = H(Y –
2)     Y –
2 < Y –
f
 Fl′(Y –




3) = H(Y –
3)    Y –
3 > Y –
f .
 Fl′ (Y –
3) = H′(Y –
3)
To be specific, these conditions can be rewritten as
 1                     Y –
2
β 1–1 Y –
2




–ε 1– –– +  –– ––Y –
fL l (Ll + L f)
–ε –LlIl =C1Y –
2
β 1 +C2Y –
2
β 2
δ [ (Y –
f ) ] (Y –
f ) [ δ ]




–ε + ––β 1 –– {Ll[(Ll +Lf)
–ε – Ll
–ε ]} = C1β 1Y –
2





 1  ––LlY –
3(Ll +L f)
–ε –LlIl = C1Y –
3




 1  ––Ll (Ll +Lf)
–ε =C1β 1Y –
3
β 1–1+C 2β 2Y –
3
β 2–1.  δ
(25)
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3.This can be regarded as a system of four equations with the four unknown variables
C1, C2, Y –
2, and Y –
3. Thus, one can solve the system numerically.
The decision-making rules by both banks can be summarized as follows:
 0 < Y < Y –
1 both banks wait.

 Y –
1 ≤ Y < Y –
2 the leader lends.
  (26)
 Y –
2 ≤ Y < Y –
3 both banks wait.

 Y –
3 ≤ Y <∞ both banks lend.
Figure 5 [1] shows the determination of each threshold value when the banks are
identical except for the predetermined roles.
32 Over the very low demand level, both
banks prefer to wait, similar to the case in which the roles are interchangeable. And
once the demand level reaches Y –
1, the leader alone enters the loan market. But if the
demand exceeds Y –
2, the leader prefers to wait rather than lend immediately. This is
because the leader knows that the probability of the follower’s entry is high over this
region. Once Y –
3 is hit, however, both enter the market immediately because the 
profits made by entry are sufficiently high for both banks.
In comparison with the results when the roles are interchangeable, the following
points are worthy of notice. If the roles of leader and follower are predetermined, as is
the case with the Japanese main bank system, when the demand level is very low, the
leader’s incentive to enter the loan market alone becomes lower (Y –
l < Y –
l). Also, there is
another inactive band for the leader (Y –
2 ≤ Y < Y –
3), over which the leader waits, because
the follower’s threshold value of demand level for entry is drawing near.
Figure 5 [2] shows the case in which the ex ante loan share of the leader is larger
than that of the follower (Ll > Lf), but the sunk costs per unit of loan are the same
(Il = If). In this case, at Y –
f, Fl (Y ) and Ff (Y ) do not meet, and they diverge as Y gets
larger in the region of Y ≥ Y –
f.
33
Figure 5 [3] illustrates the case in which the sunk costs of the leader are lower
than those of the follower (Il < If), but the ex ante loan shares are the same (Ll = Lf).
Also in this case, neither curve meets at Y –
f, although their slopes are the same from
this point on.
D. Stochastic Version of Tobin’s q
Here, note that equation (14) can be modified as
β 1 vf (Π–
f) = –––– –LfIf. (27)
β 1–1         
One can interpret equation (27) as saying there is a wedge between investment 
(sunk costs), denoted L fIf, and the present discounted value of the follower bank’s
cash flow from actual lending, which is denoted vf (Π–
f). 
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32. Two dashed curves show the values of the additional options to wait when the roles are predetermined. 
33. See equations (16) and (18).35
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Fi (Y) 
–Li Ii
Ff  (follower’s value)
Both wait Leader lends Both wait Both lend
Fl  (leader’s value)
G (leader’s option 
ɹvalue to wait)
H (leader’s option 
ɹvalue to wait)
0 Y
Y1  Y2  Y3 
Yf 
Yl 
Note: The figure is drawn under the assumption that both banks are identical except for the
          predetermined roles they assume.
Figure 5  The Case of Predetermined Roles of Leader and Follower
[1] Identical Banks
Fi (Y) 
H (leader’s option 
     value to wait)












[2] Different Ex Ante Loan Shares (Ll > Lf) and the Same Sunk Costs 
per Unit of Loan (Il = If)Thus, the wedge can be defined as
β 1 q – ≡ –––– – > 1. (28)
β 1–1         
The index q – captures a notion that is very similar and comparable to that intro-
duced by Tobin (1969). It should be noted, however, that q – 34 defined as equation
(28) depends on uncertainty
35 about future demand (and hence profit) conditions
such as the expected growth rate α , the volatility σ , and the subjective probability of 
bankruptcy of the borrowing firm λ . Hence, there will be periods when q – exceeds
one without attracting investment.
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Fi (Y) 
H (leader’s option 













[3] Different Sunk Costs per Unit of Loan (Il < If) and the Same Ex Ante
Loan Shares (Ll = Lf)
34. Conceptually, this version of q – is called the value of assets in place notion in contrast to the value of the firm
notion. In the latter case, q – should be defined as [v(Π f) – F(Π f)]/LfI f, which is net of the option value. For more
details, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
35. This is why I call q – the stochastic version of Tobin’s q in this paper.III. Numerical Analysis
In this section, I conduct numerical analysis by changing each parameter in turn, hold-
ing others fixed at plausible values. As a baseline case, I choose some parameter values
such that ε = 2 and (Il, If) = (0.2, 0.2), unless otherwise stated. Also, I handle the cases
in which (Ll, Lf) = (10, 10) and (15, 5) to analyze the effect of a change in the ex ante
loan shares on entry decisions. Hence, if both banks enter the loan market, the current
return from lending is 1.25 percent when Y = 5, for example. On the other hand, if
only the leader enters, it is 5.00 percent when Ll =10 and 2.22 percent when Ll =15.
36
The data state that the average contracted interest rate on new long-term loans and
discounts extended by domestically licensed banks fell from 5.09 percent per annum
in January 1993
37 to 2.38 percent in December 1999. Since, for example, the uncol-
lateralized call rate was 3.88 percent in January 1993, and 0.05 percent in December
1999, the baseline parameter values of ε and (Ll , L f) might not be so unrealistic.
Table 1summarizes the main results of the analysis, and Tables 2–5show the details.
First, a rise in the volatility of the future demand condition σ raises each threshold 
value uniformly, holding other parameters constant. This result makes sense, since the 
coexistence of uncertainty and irreversibility yields the value of the option to wait. 
37
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36. Recall that the inverse loan demand function is specified as rL = Y(L l + L f)
–ε .
37. The data can be obtained from January 1993. For details, see various issues of Financial and Economic Statistics
Monthly (Bank of Japan).
Table 1 Summary of Numerical Analysis
Exogenous variables Endogenous variables
Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic














Expected growth α Case (i) + + + + + +
Case (ii) –––––+
Probability of bankruptcy λ Case (a) ––––––
Case (b) –––+ ––
Ex ante loan share Ll /(Ll +Lf )+ * 0 + + – 0
Sunk costs
Il & If +++++0
If – ++++0
Inverse of interest rate elasticity 
of loan demand ε
+++++0
Notes: 1. For definitions of  
–








Y3, and – q, see equations (19), (15), (22), (25), and (28).
2. + indicates that the endogenous variable rises when the exogenous variable rises.
– indicates vice versa. 0 denotes no effect. 
3. Case (i) denotes the case in which δ is held constant, while letting ρ adjust freely.
Case (ii) denotes the case in which ρ is held constant while letting δ adjust freely.
4. Case (a) denotes the case in which α and ρ are fixed whatever the value of λ .
Case (b) denotes the case in which α and ρ increase by the same amount as λ .
5. For comparative ease, total lending amount Ll + Lf is always fixed at 20.
* If ε is small (ε < 0.8), this is negative.38 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 2001
Table 2 Dependence of Each Threshold Value on α and σ
[1] The Case of Fixed δ :δ = 0.03 (Adjustable ρ )
A. (Ll , Lf) = (10, 10), λ = 0, ε = 2, (Il , If) = (0.2, 0.2)
Parameters Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic













0.00 0.05 0.600 2.942 0.736 2.604 4.028 1.226
0.10 0.615 3.600 0.900 2.908 5.694 1.500
0.20 0.725 5.317 1.329 3.808 9.851 2.215
0.01 0.05 0.612 3.515 0.879 3.265 4.220 1.465
0.10 0.642 4.149 1.037 3.512 5.885 1.729
0.20 0.772 5.898 1.474 4.380 10.174 2.457
0.02 0.05 0.647 4.231 1.058 4.032 4.804 1.763
0.10 0.686 4.800 1.200 4.211 6.348 2.000
0.20 0.825 6.530 1.632 5.008 10.634 2.721
0.03 0.05 0.700 4.993 1.248 4.820 5.508 2.080
0.10 0.740 5.509 1.377 4.956 6.954 2.295
0.20 0.884 7.200 1.800 5.677 11.190 3.000
B. (Ll , Lf) = (15, 5), λ = 0, ε = 2, (Il , If) = (0.2, 0.2)
Parameters Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic













0.00 0.05 1.372 2.942 1.655 2.664 3.487 1.226
0.10 1.473 3.600 2.025 3.091 4.496 1.500
0.20 1.715 5.317 2.991 4.338 6.944 2.215
0.01 0.05 1.459 3.515 1.977 3.301 3.923 1.465
0.10 1.561 4.149 2.334 3.660 4.982 1.729
0.20 1.779 5.898 3.318 4.883 7.556 2.457
0.02 0.05 1.573 4.231 2.380 4.055 4.585 1.763
0.10 1.652 4.800 2.700 4.322 5.602 2.000
0.20 1.840 6.530 3.673 5.482 8.224 2.721
0.03 0.05 1.677 4.993 2.808 4.837 5.323 2.080
0.10 1.737 5.509 3.099 5.057 6.297 2.295
0.20 1.898 7.200 4.050 6.123 8.932 3.00039
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[2] The Case of Fixed ρ : ρ = 0.04 (Adjustable δ )
A. (Ll , Lf) = (10, 10), λ = 0, ε = 2, (Il , If) = (0.2, 0.2)
Parameters Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic













0.00 0.05 0.800 3.818 0.954 3.428 5.092 1.193
0.10 0.811 4.549 1.137 3.756 6.968 1.422
0.20 0.914 6.400 1.600 4.704 11.485 2.000
0.01 0.05 0.612 3.515 0.879 3.265 4.220 1.465
0.10 0.642 4.149 1.037 3.512 5.885 1.729
0.20 0.772 5.898 1.474 4.380 10.174 2.457
0.02 0.05 0.471 3.389 0.847 3.225 3.856 2.118
0.10 0.510 3.881 0.970 3.379 5.177 2.425
0.20 0.649 5.463 1.366 4.116 9.064 3.414
0.03 0.05 0.380 3.332 0.833 3.213 3.681 4.165
0.10 0.415 3.710 0.927 3.310 4.728 4.637
0.20 0.546 5.098 1.274 3.908 8.150 6.372
B. (Ll , Lf) = (15, 5), λ = 0, ε = 2, (Il , If) = (0.2, 0.2)
Parameters Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic













0.00 0.05 1.818 3.818 2.148 3.491 4.476 1.193
0.10 1.923 4.549 2.559 3.951 5.621 1.422
0.20 2.203 6.400 3.600 5.272 8.291 2.000
0.01 0.05 1.459 3.515 1.977 3.301 3.923 1.465
0.10 1.561 4.149 2.334 3.660 4.982 1.729
0.20 1.779 5.898 3.318 4.883 7.556 2.457
0.02 0.05 1.125 3.389 1.907 3.245 3.677 2.118
0.10 1.181 3.881 2.183 3.486 4.546 2.425
0.20 1.316 5.463 3.073 4.553 6.918 3.414
0.03 0.05 0.696 3.332 1.874 3.225 3.555 4.165
0.10 0.717 3.710 2.087 3.387 4.259 4.637
0.20 0.775 5.098 2.868 4.283 6.382 6.37240 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 2001
Table 3 Dependence of Each Threshold Value on λ
[1] The Case of Fixed α
Parameter Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic













0.0 0.725 5.317 1.329 3.808 9.851 2.215
0.1 0.613 3.544 0.886 2.881 5.555 1.477
0.2 0.604 3.220 0.805 2.727 4.742 1.342
0.3 0.601 3.068 0.767 2.659 4.354 1.278
0.4 0.601 2.976 0.744 2.619 4.117 1.240
0.5 0.600 2.914 0.728 2.592 3.952 1.214
1.0 0.600 2.759 0.690 2.528 3.537 1.149
Note: Calculations are made under the assumption that the expected growth parameter α is fixed 
at zero. Other parameters are set as follows: δ = 0.03 (thus, ρ = 0.03), σ = 0.2, ε = 2, 
(Ll , Lf) = (10, 10), and (Il, If) = (0.2, 0.2).
[2] The Case of Flexible α
Parameter Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic













0.0 0.725 5.317 1.329 3.808 9.851 2.215
0.1 0.698 4.961 1.240 4.418 6.387 2.067
0.2 0.693 4.896 1.224 4.558 5.817 2.040
0.3 0.691 4.869 1.217 4.622 5.567 2.029
0.4 0.690 4.853 1.213 4.659 5.423 2.022
0.5 0.689 4.844 1.211 4.683 5.328 2.018
1.0 0.687 4.823 1.206 4.736 5.112 2.010
Note: Calculations are made under the assumption that the expected growth parameter α and ρ
adjust by the same amount in the same direction as λ . α is set at zero when λ is zero. Other
parameters are set as follows: δ = 0.03, σ = 0.2, ε = 2, (Ll , Lf) = (10, 10), and (Il , I f) = (0.2, 0.2).41
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Table 4 Dependence of Each Threshold Value on α and (I l , If)
[1] The Case of Fixed δ :δ = 0.03 (Adjustable ρ )
A. (Ll , Lf) = (10, 10), λ = 0, ε = 2, σ = 0.1
Parameters Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic
Leader Follower Leader Follower Tobin’s q












0.00 0.1 0.1 0.307 1.800 0.450 1.454 2.847 1.500
0.2 0.302 3.600 0.450 2.991 5.183 1.500
0.3 0.301 5.400 0.450 4.521 7.586 1.500
0.2 0.2 0.615 3.600 0.900 2.908 5.694 1.500
0.3 0.606 5.400 0.900 4.448 7.994 1.500
0.01 0.1 0.1 0.321 2.074 0.519 1.756 2.942 1.729
0.2 0.307 4.149 0.519 3.614 5.358 1.729
0.3 0.304 6.223 0.519 5.462 7.863 1.729
0.2 0.2 0.643 4.149 1.037 3.512 5.885 1.729
0.3 0.623 6.223 1.037 5.376 8.248 1.729
0.02 0.1 0.1 0.343 2.400 0.600 2.106 3.174 2.000
0.2 0.318 4.800 0.600 4.323 5.807 2.000
0.3 0.312 7.200 0.600 6.527 8.549 2.000
0.2 0.2 0.686 4.800 1.200 4.211 6.348 2.000
0.3 0.652 7.200 1.200 6.437 8.914 2.000
B. (Ll , Lf) = (15, 5), λ = 0, ε = 2, σ = 0.1
Parameters Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic
Leader Follower Leader Follower Tobin’s q













0.00 0.1 0.1 0.737 1.800 1.012 1.546 2.248 1.500
0.2 0.688 3.600 1.012 3.232 4.170 1.500
0.3 0.680 5.400 1.012 4.894 6.158 1.500
0.2 0.2 1.473 3.600 2.025 3.091 4.496 1.500
0.3 1.397 5.400 2.025 4.792 6.378 1.500
0.01 0.1 0.1 0.780 2.074 1.167 1.830 2.491 1.729
0.2 0.707 4.149 1.167 3.832 4.612 1.729
0.3 0.693 6.223 1.167 5.797 6.824 1.729
0.2 0.2 1.561 4.149 2.334 3.660 4.982 1.729
0.3 1.452 6.223 2.334 5.686 7.043 1.729
0.02 0.1 0.1 0.826 2.400 1.350 2.166 2.801 2.000
0.2 0.735 4.800 1.350 4.519 5.198 2.000
0.3 0.712 7.200 1.350 6.828 7.709 2.000
0.2 0.2 1.652 4.800 2.700 4.332 5.602 2.000
0.3 1.521 7.200 2.700 6.715 7.923 2.000
Note: 
–
Y1 becomes larger slightly as If becomes larger, other things equal, although the figures in the
tables are the same.42 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 2001
[2] The Case of Fixed ρ : ρ = 0.04 (Adjustable δ )
A. (Ll , Lf) = (10, 10), λ = 0, ε = 2, σ = 0.1
Parameters Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic
Leader Follower Leader Follower Tobin’s q













0.00 0.1 0.1 0.406 2.274 0.569 1.878 3.484 1.422
0.2 0.401 4.549 0.569 3.857 6.332 1.422
0.3 0.400 6.823 0.569 5.827 9.269 1.422
0.2 0.2 0.811 4.549 1.137 3.756 6.968 1.422
0.3 0.804 6.823 1.137 5.739 9.765 1.422
0.01 0.1 0.1 0.321 2.074 0.519 1.756 2.942 1.729
0.2 0.307 4.149 0.519 3.614 5.358 1.729
0.3 0.304 6.223 0.519 5.462 7.863 1.729
0.2 0.2 0.643 4.149 1.037 3.512 5.885 1.729
0.3 0.623 6.223 1.037 5.376 8.248 1.729
0.02 0.1 0.1 0.255 1.940 0.485 1.689 2.588 2.425
0.2 0.228 3.881 0.485 3.474 4.733 2.425
0.3 0.220 5.821 0.485 5.246 6.965 2.425
0.2 0.2 0.510 3.881 0.970 3.379 5.177 2.425
0.3 0.473 5.821 0.970 5.170 7.268 2.425
B. (Ll , Lf) = (15, 5), λ = 0, ε = 2, σ = 0.1
Parameters Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic
Leader Follower Leader Follower Tobin’s q












0.00 0.1 0.1 0.961 2.274 1.279 1.975 2.810 1.422
0.2 0.910 4.549 1.279 4.128 5.201 1.422
0.3 0.904 6.823 1.279 6.823 7.683 1.422
0.2 0.2 1.923 4.549 2.559 3.951 5.621 1.422
0.3 1.841 6.823 2.559 6.123 7.955 1.422
0.01 0.1 0.1 0.780 2.074 1.167 1.830 2.491 1.729
0.2 0.707 4.149 1.167 3.832 4.612 1.729
0.3 0.693 6.223 1.167 5.797 6.824 1.729
0.2 0.2 1.561 4.149 2.334 3.660 4.982 1.729
0.3 1.452 6.223 2.334 5.686 7.043 1.729
0.02 0.1 0.1 0.590 1.940 1.091 1.743 2.273 2.425
0.2 0.519 3.881 1.091 3.642 4.217 2.425
0.3 0.499 5.821 1.091 5.504 6.252 2.425
0.2 0.2 1.181 3.881 2.183 3.486 4.546 2.425
0.3 1.082 5.821 2.183 5.410 6.429 2.425
Note: 
–
Y1 becomes larger slightly as If becomes larger, other things equal, although the figures in the
tables are the same.43
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Table 5 Dependence of Each Threshold Value on ε (δ = 0.03, ρ = 0.04 , σ = 0.2)
A. (Ll , Lf) = (10, 10), (Il , If) = (0.2, 0.2), λ = 0
Parameters Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic













0.2 0.021 0.027 0.023 0.025 0.029 2.457
0.4 0.030 0.049 0.037 0.044 0.056 2.457
0.6 0.043 0.089 0.059 0.076 0.107 2.457
0.8 0.063 0.162 0.093 0.135 0.206 2.457
1.0 0.094 0.295 0.147 0.239 0.395 2.457
1.2 0.142 0.537 0.234 0.425 0.758 2.457
1.4 0.215 0.977 0.370 0.758 1.451 2.457
1.6 0.328 1.779 0.587 1.358 2.778 2.457
1.8 0.502 3.240 0.930 2.436 5.317 2.457
2.0 0.772 5.898 1.474 4.380 10.174 2.457
2.2 1.191 10.737 2.337 7.886 19.468 2.457
2.4 1.844 19.548 3.704 14.219 37.254 2.457
2.6 2.862 35.689 5.870 25.665 71.303 2.457
2.8 4.454 64.791 9.303 46.369 136.510 2.457
3.0 6.944 117.957 14.745 83.847 261.434 2.457
B. (Ll , Lf) = (15, 5), (Il , If) = (0.2, 0.2), λ = 0
Parameters Interchangeable roles Predetermined roles Stochastic













0.2 0.012 0.027 0.025 0.026 0.028 2.457
0.4 0.021 0.049 0.044 0.046 0.052 2.457
0.6 0.037 0.089 0.075 0.083 0.097 2.457
0.8 0.065 0.162 0.129 0.147 0.180 2.457
1.0 0.113 0.295 0.221 0.263 0.336 2.457
1.2 0.198 0.537 0.380 0.470 0.627 2.457
1.4 0.344 0.977 0.653 0.843 1.169 2.457
1.6 0.596 1.779 1.123 1.512 2.179 2.457
1.8 1.031 3.240 1.930 2.716 4.058 2.457
2.0 1.779 5.898 3.318 4.883 7.556 2.457
2.2 3.064 10.737 5.702 8.787 14.063 2.457
2.4 5.269 19.548 9.801 15.827 26.168 2.457
2.6 9.047 35.689 16.845 28.527 48.682 2.457
2.8 15.514 64.791 28.953 51.455 90.549 2.457
3.0 26.571 117.957 49.763 92.866 168.393 2.457Second, in contrast, the direction of the effect of a rise in the expected growth
parameter α on lending decisions depends on the presumption regarding which para-
meter is adjustable, the risk-adjusted discount rate ρ or the dividend rate δ when α
changes.
38 When one assumes that ρ adjusts to accommodate the rise in α , it raises
each threshold. On the other hand, if one assumes that δ adjusts to offset the rise in
α , holding ρ constant, the rise in α lowers each threshold except for q –.
Third, look at the result of a rise in the probability of bankruptcy, λ . Generally
speaking, the effects can be stated in the following ways.
39 First, it reduces the
expected rate of capital gain on Π l (= rLLl) and Π f , which in turn decreases the value
of the option to wait. Second, it increases the variance of changes in Π l and Π f , and
thus raises the value of the option to wait. 
The result shows that, in general, the net effect is to reduce the threshold values
for both banks. But if one assumes that an increase in λ raises the value of α by the
same amount, which means that an increase in λ is approximately equivalent to an
increase in the risk-adjusted discount rate ρ , the direction of the effect is the same
except for Y –
2, but the magnitude is reduced.
Fourth, a rise in the leader bank’s share Ll/(Ll + Lf) has no effect on Y –
f and q –.
But it raises Y –
l (when ε > 0.8), Y –
1, and Y –
2, although it lowers Y –
3.
Fifth, a uniform rise in the sunk costs per unit of loan paid by both banks raises
each threshold value. On the other hand, a relative rise in If lowers Y –
l , but raises
other threshold values. However, q – remains constant in each case. 
Lastly, regarding the effect of a rise in the inverse of the interest elasticity of 
loan demand ε ,  q – has nothing to do with the level of ε , while other threshold 
values change if one changes ε , holding other things constant. Each threshold value
rises together with a rise in ε , since given the value of L l and L f, a larger value of ε
implies a smaller value of interest rate rL. It should be noted, however, that as the
value of ε falls so that the loan market becomes more competitive, each threshold
value tends to converge. 
IV. Discussions
What implications can be derived from the analysis thus far regarding the recent slump
in the Japanese loan market? In this section, I will explore the link between the actual
bank lending situation in Japan and the insights derived from the theoretical model. 
First and most importantly, the model shows that when the roles of leader and 
follower are predetermined as is the case with the Japanese main bank system, both
leader and follower banks have a greater incentive to wait and see until the demand
condition sufficiently improves than when the roles are interchangeable. And the
degree of the tendency to wait becomes higher as the degree of uncertainty about the
future demand condition becomes higher. It is generally acknowledged that the
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38. Recall the relationship ρ = α + δ .
39. Note that in this paper, costs stemming from the real bankruptcy procedure such as the loss from liquidation are
not taken into consideration. These considerations are likely to raise the value of the option to wait.Japanese main bank system had succeeded in providing enough funds to the business
sector by alleviating the informational problems. But the structure of the predeter-
mined role of leader and follower in the loan market causes the banks to be more
cautious in extending new loans. 
Second, it is often said that, compared with the bubble period, the expected
growth forecasts about future general demand conditions have bent downward. It is
natural to think that the same tendency should occur in the bank loan market once
one considers the significant presence of bank lending in fund-raising by Japan’s 
business sector. This hypothesis can be roughly verified by looking at the data
reported in various issues of the Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan
issued by the Bank of Japan. These show that the Japanese business sector has
decreased
40 its borrowing from financial institutions. This is because many corpo-
rations have revised their fixed investment plans downward,
41 reflecting their reduced 
forecasts about future demand conditions. 
In this regard, the model says that if one assumes that the risk-adjusted discount
rate ρ for private banks is constant regardless of the value of the expected growth
parameter α ,
42 a fall in α raises the threshold values, which implies that the banks’
incentive to supply loans weakens given the current demand situation. 
Third, various surveys state that the Japanese economy as a whole faces a much
higher degree of uncertainty about future business conditions than before. That is
likely to lead to a rise in uncertainty for banks about future corporate borrowing
demand. In this regard, the model says that a rise in the uncertainty (volatility) 
parameter σ definitely dampens the incentive to enter the loan market. 
Lastly, it is often pointed out that the interest rate elasticity of loan demand
43 has
decreased recently. This kind of remark generally reflects the prolonged depressed
condition of the loan market despite the significantly lowered lending interest rate. If
this is the case, the model states that a fall in the interest rate elasticity of loan
demand should cause the threshold values for both banks to rise, which implies a
higher probability of not making an entry decision.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper has explored banks’ entry decisions into a duopolistic loan market to shed
light on the recent slump in the Japanese loan market. The game-theoretic real
options approach is employed to analyze the effects of uncertainty on lending 
decisions. The theoretical model shows that when the roles of leader and follower 
are predetermined as in the case of the Japanese main bank system, both banks have 
a greater incentive to wait than when the roles are interchangeable. This result might
45
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40. The same source also reports that Japanese firms plan to restrain borrowing in the future.
41. Also, the continuing structural shift from indirect finance like bank borrowings to direct finance such as direct debt
is thought to contribute to a fall in the expected growth rate of future loan demand, especially among large firms.
42. This assumption implicitly presumes that the risk-free interest rate, variance, risk price, and beta of the return 
are stable.
43. Note that in this paper ε denotes the inverse of interest rate elasticity. explain why the Japanese loan market has been so stagnant since the bursting of the
bubble economy in the early 1990s. 
At least to my knowledge, the attempts to apply the real options approach to bank
lending decisions particularly in the oligopolistic market structure have been quite
rare thus far. I sincerely hope that this paper provides a useful starting point for
future discussions in this field.
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